Mercer Law Review
Volume 59
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 9

12-2007

Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Treadwell, Marc T. (2007) "Evidence," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 59 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol59/iss1/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The most significant news during the current survey period continued
to be the judiciary's efforts to come to terms with the "tort reform"
legislation enacted by the General Assembly in 2005, particularly
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 24-9-67.1,1
which purports to adopt, more or less, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.2 As
discussed below, it is beginning to appear that Georgia courts will follow
a somewhat different course than that followed by federal courts in their
interpretation of Daubert and Daubert's codification in Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. 3
As discussed in many prior surveys,4 Georgia continues to creep, both
through legislative enactments and State Bar of Georgia initiatives,
toward the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As this Article
was being written, the State Bar of Georgia was once again pushing the
General Assembly to adopt a new evidence code that would be based on
the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 The current version of the Georgia

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2007).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. FED. R. EVID. 702.
4. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 58 MERCER L. REV. 151, 151 (2006); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 175, 175 (1989); see also Marc Treadwell, An
Analysis of Georgia'sProposedRules of Evidence, 26 GA. ST. B.J. 173, 173-84 (1990).
5. EVIDENCE STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE EVIDENCE STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA: PROPOSED NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE 4 (2005), available at

http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/proposed-new-evidencerules.pdf.
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Rules of Evidence can be found at the State Bar's website.6 Off and on
for almost twenty years, the State Bar has unsuccessfully advocated the
adoption of a new evidence code. It seems that while most trial lawyers
may generally favor the adoption of a new evidence code, all lawyers can
find a particular provision in the proposed code that is unpalatable. For
example, prosecutors-who purportedly stopped the legislature from
extending O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 to criminal cases-likely will
oppose any further attempts to subject their expert witnesses to a
Daubert or Daubert-likestandard, which is what the proposed code will
do.
Nevertheless, Georgia evidence law more closely resembles the Federal
Rules of Evidence than it did when the State Bar first proposed the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example, in 2005 the
General Assembly enacted new O.C.G.A. section 24-9-81, 7 which is
nearly identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 607,8 new O.C.G.A. section
24-9-84, 9 which is based on Federal Rules of Evidence 608,' ° and
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1,11 which mostly adopts Federal Rule of
Evidence 609.12 Also, as noted Daubert has come to Georgia, if not

quite the same Daubert seen in federal court. Incidentally, this survey
Article, in its discussion of Georgia evidence law and decisions, has
always tracked the organizational format of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
11.
A.

RELEVANCY

ExtrinsicAct Evidence

Since this Author began surveying evidence decisions for Mercer Law
Review's Annual Survey of Georgia Law in 1988, the most frequently

encountered relevancy issue has been whether extrinsic act evidence is
admissible. "Extrinsic act evidence," a term used more frequently by
federal courts, generally refers to evidence of conduct on occasions other
than the occasion at issue that is offered as substantive, as opposed to

6. State Bar of Georgia-Legal Resources by Subject, http://www.gabar.org/member
_essentials/legal-resourcesbysubject (select "Georgia Code"; then select "Title 24").
7. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 (Supp. 2007).
8. FED. R. EVID. 607.
9. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84 (Supp. 2007).
10. FED. R. EVID. 608.
11. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (Supp. 2007).
12. FED. R. EvID. 609; see also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187,
200-01 (2005).
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impeachment, evidence.13
Georgia courts mostly use the phrase
"similar transaction evidence" when referring to extrinsic act evidence. 4 However, as pointed out by the Georgia Supreme Court in
Young v. State,15 that phrase does not always accurately describe the
type of extrinsic act evidence that can be admitted.1" In Young the
court acknowledged that although most cases, and even the Uniform
Superior Court Rules," refer to "similar" transaction evidence, more
than just similar extrinsic evidence can be admissible."8 As stated in
the seminal case of Williams v.State, 9 the test is whether "'there is a
sufficient connection or similaritybetween the independent offense or act
and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the
latter."'2 ° Thus, it is not just similar transactions that may be admissible; acts or transactions that are sufficiently connected to the charged
offense may also be admissible. 2'
Generally, extrinsic act evidence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible.22 Nevertheless, like the rule against hearsay, the rule against
extrinsic act evidence is known more for its exceptions than its
prohibition. The supreme court's decision in Williams likely sets forth
the most cited test for the admission of extrinsic act evidence in
Georgia.23 The court in Williams held that the prosecution must prove
three elements before similar transaction can be admitted. 24 First, the
prosecution must prove the relevance of the independent transaction to
a legitimate issue. 25 Second, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant committed the independent offense or act.26 Third, the
prosecution must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the
prior act or offense and the charged offense. 27 The trial court must

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
S.E.2d
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (1995); FED. R. EVID. 404.
E.g., Young v. State, 281 Ga. 750, 752, 642 S.E.2d 806, 808 (2007).
281 Ga. 750, 642 S.E.2d 806 (2007).
Id. at 752, 642 S.E.2d at 808.
GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.3.
Young, 281 Ga. at 752, 642 S.E.2d at 808.
261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
Young, 281 Ga. at 752, 642 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting Williams, 261 Ga. at 642, 409
at 651 (emphasis added by court)).
See id.
See O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2; FED. R. EVID. 404.
See generally Williams, 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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then make a specific determination that the prosecution has carried its
burden of proving each of these three elements.28
In Young the prosecution contended that the defendant killed the
victim because the victim knew about the defendant's involvement in a
previous murder. There was evidence that the pistol used in the first
murder was also used in the second murder. Contending that evidence
of the first murder was relevant similar transaction evidence, the
prosecution gave notice, pursuant to Georgia Uniform Superior Court
Rule 31.3,29 of its intent to introduce evidence of the previous murder.
The trial court applied the Williams test and concluded that the evidence
did not meet the test's standards, apparently because the evidence was
not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be admissible as similar
transaction evidence. However, the trial court ruled that the evidence
was nevertheless admissible to prove the defendant's motive to commit
the charged offense.3" On interlocutory appeal, the supreme court
concluded that although the trial court's analysis of the extrinsic act
evidence was defective, the result was correct. 3' As discussed above,
the question is whether the extrinsic act evidence is sufficiently similar
or connected. 2 In Young the first murder was clearly not similar to the
second murder, but according to the prosecution's theory, it was
connected.33 The court held that there was sufficient evidence to
establish a connection between the two offenses because the defendant
was allegedly concerned his victim might be a "snitch" and tell authori34
ties about the defendant's involvement in the first murder.
Although typically it is the prosecution that wants to introduce
extrinsic act evidence, the defense sometimes seeks to introduce evidence
of extrinsic conduct by victims. For example, in McWilliams v. State ,3 5
the defendant contended that the trial court should have admitted
evidence of the alleged victim's history of illegal drug use and prostitution.3 6 On appeal, the supreme court acknowledged that although the
character of a murder victim is generally irrelevant, evidence of a
propensity for violence on the part of a victim can be admissible to
support the defense of justification. 37 However, the defendant did not

28.

Id.

29.

GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.3.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Young, 281 Ga. at 752, 642 S.E.2d at 808.
Id.
Williams, 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
281 Ga. at 752-53, 642 S.E.2d at 808-09.
Id. at 753, 642 S.E.2d at 809.
280 Ga. 724, 632 S.E.2d 127 (2006).
Id. at 725, 632 S.E.2d at 129.
Id.
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claim justification, and therefore that exception to the general rule was
not applicable.3" What the defendant did contend was that the trial
court improperly excluded evidence that the victim was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of his death.3 9 The defendant adduced evidence from an expert that the combination of alcohol
and cocaine intoxication "in some people, produces strange behavior,
including aggression."4" The supreme court reasoned that this was
sufficient to prove a causal connection between evidence of the victim's
history of intoxication and the victim's behavior, and thus the evidence
should have been admitted.4 1 The error, however, was not prejudicial,
and therefore the supreme court affirmed the defendant's conviction.4 2
Extrinsic act evidence can also be relevant in civil cases, although,
perhaps ironically, courts seem more reluctant to admit extrinsic act
evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases. It would seem that in
criminal cases, when freedom and potentially life itself are at stake, the
courts would be more circumspect in the admission of prejudicial
extrinsic act evidence than in civil cases, which typically involve only
monetary damages. There is, however, a logical basis for this dichotomy.
Criminal cases typically concern intentional conduct and therefore raise
issues such as motive, scheme, identity, or other state of mind issues.
Thus, for example, proof that a defendant intentionally committed a
similar offense may tend to identify him as the perpetrator of the
charged offense. Civil cases, on the other hand, typically do not involve
state of mind issues, but rather involve issues of negligence or other
unintentional acts. The fact that someone was negligent on a prior
occasion would prove nothing in a suit arising from a subsequent
allegedly negligent act, except perhaps that the defendant was prone to
be negligent, and propensity is generally not a permissible use of
extrinsic act evidence. As in criminal cases, the issue in civil cases is
whether the extrinsic act is relevant to some issue in the case.
Perhaps contrary to the general impression that it is more difficult to
get extrinsic act evidence admitted in civil cases than in criminal cases,
the court of appeals took an expansive view of the use of extrinsic act
evidence in Kellett v. Kumar.43 In Kellett the plaintiffs contended that
the defendants breached fiduciary duties arising from the parties'

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 725-26, 632 S.E.2d at 129-30.
Id. at 726, 632 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 727, 632 S.E.2d at 130.
281 Ga. App. 120, 635 S.E.2d 310 (2006).
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nursing home partnership." Over the defendants' objection, the trial
court allowed the plaintiffs to cross-examine one defendant about a prior
lawsuit in which it was alleged that he had breached fiduciary duties
arising from a similar agreement involving another nursing home. 5
On appeal, the court of appeals acknowledged that extrinsic act evidence
is generally inadmissible in civil cases. 6 However, the court noted that
"'such evidence may under certain limited circumstances be admissible
47
to establish, among other things, a course of conduct or bad faith.'
With little discussion, other than noting that both cases involved similar
allegations, the court of appeals held that the trial court "did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the former case as evidence demonstrating
[the defendant's] course of conduct."48 Thus, it was permissible for the
plaintiff to introduce allegations by a nonparty in a previous lawsuit to
prove that the defendant engaged in similar acts in the pending lawsuit.
This would seem to be a very relaxed standard for the admission of
extrinsic act evidence whether in a civil case or a criminal case.
B.

PrejudicialImpact vs. Probative Value

Although Georgia does not have a codified counterpart to Federal Rule
of Evidence 403, 49 which permits a trial court to exclude relevant
evidence if the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighs its
probative value, Georgia courts nevertheless recognize this principle, and
trial judges have the discretion to exclude evidence on the ground that
it is just too prejudicial -to be admitted.5 °
In Adkins v. State,5 the defendant understandably, but unsuccessfully, attempted to avail himself of this principle. 2 At the time of his
arrest, the defendant, who was charged in a fatal drive-by shooting, had
the remarkable misfortune to be wearing a hat which bore the phrase
"'Fuck everybody."'5 3 Of course, the prosecution very much wanted the
jury to be able to see the hat. Noting that the circumstances surrounding an arrest are admissible if relevant and that the defendant was

44. Id. at 121, 635 S.E.2d at 312.
45. Id. at 124, 635 S.E.2d at 314.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Wood v. D.G. Jenkins Homes, Inc., 255 Ga. App. 572, 572, 565 S.E.2d
886, 888 (2002)).
48. Id. at 125, 635 S.E.2d at 314.
49. FED. R. EVID. 403.
50. For a discussion of this principle, see Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L.
REV. 187, 197-98 (2005).
51. 280 Ga. 761, 632 S.E.2d 650 (2006).
52. See id. at 763, 632 S.E.2d at 654.
53. Id.
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wearing clothing similar to descriptions of clothing worn by the
perpetrators, the supreme court held that the trial court could, in its
discretion, either admit the evidence or, if the court thought it unduly
prejudicial, exclude it. 4 Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted the hat.55
C.

Miscellaneous Relevancy Issues

On its face, the court of appeals decision in Dees v. Logan 56 is
baffling.5" Only if one knows the procedural posture of the case at
trial, which unfortunately the court of appeals did not disclose in its
opinion, does the holding make sense. In Dees the plaintiffs sued the
driver of a car that struck their car. Because the defendant had only the
minimal liability insurance coverage of $25,000, the plaintiffs also joined
their underinsured motorist carrier as a party. Prior to trial, the
plaintiffs entered into a settlement with the defendant's liability carrier
pursuant to Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 33-711(a)(1),5 8 which allows a plaintiff to settle with a liability carrier and
59
still pursue claims against his underinsured motorist carrier. Under
these circumstances, a plaintiff still has to prove that the tortfeasor was
negligent and that this negligence proximately caused his or her
damages.6 0 However, under most policies, punitive damages cannot be
1
recovered from an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier." In
Dees the trial court granted the underinsured motorist carrier's motion
in limine to exclude evidence that the defendant was intoxicated. After
trial, the plaintiff appealed this ruling. s2 The court of appeals ruled
that because punitive damages cannot be recovered from an uninsured
or underinsured motorist carrier, evidence of the defendant's intoxication
was not relevant.6 3 Based on the information disclosed in the opinion,

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 281 Ga. App. 837, 637 S.E.2d 424 (2006), rev'd on other grounds, No. S0760290,
2007 WL 4124536, at *2 (Ga. Nov. 21, 2007).
57. Dees received much attention from the trial bar because of its holding on the right
of an uninsured motorist carrier to offset a jury's verdict by amounts received by the
plaintiff in workers' compensation and Social Security disability benefits. Nevertheless,
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals on this issue. Dees, 2007 WL 4124536, at
*2.
58. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (2000).
59. Id.; Dees, 281 Ga. App. at 837, 637 S.E.2d at 426.
60. Dees, 281 Ga. App. at 838, 637 S.E.2d at 426.
61. Id. at 839, 637 S.E.2d at 427.
62. Id. at 837, 637 S.E.2d at 426.
63. Id. at 838, 637 S.E.2d at 426.
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the holding does not make sense. While evidence of intoxication is
relevant to prove conduct that would support an award of punitive
damages, it is also probative of negligence and thus clearly relevant in
a negligence action. The opinion, as written, suggests that in negligence
actions, evidence of the underinsured motorist's drunkenness is not
admissible if the plaintiff settles with the underinsured motorist's
liability carrier.
However, what was not in the opinion was that the underinsured
motorist carrier admitted the defendant's negligence prior to trial. Thus,
there was no issue of either negligence or willful misconduct. In light
of this fact, the court of appeals opinion makes sense. Because the
underinsured motorist carrier admitted the defendant's negligence and
because the underinsured motorist carrier cannot be held responsible for
punitive damages, the fact that the defendant was intoxicated was not
relevant to any remaining issue in the case.
The court of appeals decision in H.D. McCondichie Properties v.
Georgia Department of Transportation64 may be as noteworthy for what
it does not say as for what it does. In McCondichie, a condemnation
action, the property owner subpoenaed one of the Department of
Transportation ("D.O.T.") appraisers to testify at trial when the D.O.T.
announced that it would not itself call the witness. The D.O.T. then
moved in limine to prevent the property owner from eliciting testimony
that the expert had originally been hired to provide by the D.O.T.65 In
a brief discussion, the court reasoned that the only relevant issue was
appropriate compensation for the condemned property, and according to
the court, the "issue of who hired a particular expert had nothing to do"
with that issue. 6 Clearly, however, the property owner's intention was
to bolster the credibility of the expert by establishing that the D.O.T.
had first hired the expert. This would imply that the D.O.T. thought the
expert was qualified to determine the value of the condemned property.
However, none of this was mentioned in the court's opinion.
It is rare for an appellate court to reverse a defendant's conviction on
the grounds that the trial court admitted irrelevant evidence. Either the
court determines the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted the evidence, or the court finds that the error, if any, was not
prejudicial and thus harmless. The supreme court's decision in Kell v.
State67 is one of the few exceptions to this pattern. In Kell the defendant was charged with the murder of his landlord. On direct examina-

64. 280 Ga. App. 197, 633 S.E.2d 558 (2006).
65. Id. at 197, 633 S.E.2d at 559.
66. Id. at 198, 633 S.E.2d at 559.
67. 280 Ga. 669, 631 S.E.2d 679 (2006).
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tion by the prosecutor, the defendant's wife provided testimony
corroborating the defendant's version of events. The defendant's wife
denied that the defendant had threatened her or attempted to coerce her
in letters he had written to her after his arrest. Subsequently, the
prosecutor cross-examined the defendant's brother about allegations that
the brother had assaulted the wife in order to retrieve the allegedly
threatening letters. Apparently, the letters were never found. The
prosecution argued that this evidence was admissible because it tended
the defendant had attempted to influence the wife's
to prove that
68
testimony.
On appeal, the supreme court acknowledged that evidence of a
defendant's attempt to intimidate a witness is relevant because it
provides circumstantial evidence of guilt. 69 Even if there is no evidence

that a defendant himself coerced or attempted to coerce a witness,
evidence of coercion can still be relevant if the prosecution can show that
Here,
the coercion was done with a defendant's authorization.7"
however, the supreme court held there was neither evidence that the
defendant authorized his brother's alleged attempt to influence the wife's
testimony nor was there evidence that the defendant authorized his
brother to retrieve the incriminating letters.7 ' According to the court,
the mere fact that they were siblings was not sufficient to establish that
the brother was acting with the defendant's authorization.72 The
prosecution, however, argued that even in the absence of evidence of
authorization, the evidence was nevertheless relevant because it still
tended to show that the wife, as a result of the intimidation, testified
falsely. Thus, even though there was no evidence that the defendant
authorized the coercion, the prosecution still contended that it could
argue that the wife's testimony was false as a result of coercion.73 The
court pointed out two problems with this argument. First, there was no
evidence that the altercation between the brother and the wife had
anything to do with the wife's testimony.74 Second, in closing, the
prosecution did not limit its argument to its contention that the wife's
testimony was false; rather, the prosecution specifically argued that the
defendant and his family had tampered with the evidence by coercing

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 670-71, 631 S.E.2d at 680-81.
Id. at 671, 631 S.E.2d at 681.
Id.
Id. at 672, 631 S.E.2d at 681-82.
Id.
Id., 631 S.E.2d at 682.

74.

Id.
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the wife and destroying the allegedly threatening letters.75 However,
because there was absolutely no evidence that the letters contained
threats, the court held that the evidence of the brother's altercation with
the wife over the allegedly threatening letters was not relevant and the
admission of that evidence, and the State's argument about that
evidence, prejudiced the defendant, particularly in view of the circumstantial nature of the case against the defendant.76
III.
A.

WITNESSES

Impeachment With Evidence of Convictions

Among other things, the Criminal Justice Act of 200577 enacted
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1,78 which largely adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 609"9 regarding the use of convictions to impeach witnesses.
Although prior Georgia law governing the use of convictions to impeach
witnesses, which had never been codified, was similar to the new
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1, there are at least two significant differences.
First, O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1, like Rule 609, prohibits the use of a
conviction that is more than ten years old unless the court determines
that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect.8 0 Prior Georgia law had no such temporal limitation.
In Hinton v. State,8' the trial court ruled that the defendant could not
impeach two prosecution witnesses with evidence of their convictions
because the convictions were more than ten years old. On appeal from
his conviction, the defendant contended that this limitation on his right
to confront his witnesses violated his Sixth Amendment rights and his
right under Georgia law to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. 2
The supreme court, noting that O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1(b) was
identical to Rule 609(b), cited federal authority concluding that
convictions over ten years old generally do not have significant probative
value.83
Moreover, the statute did not conclusively bar all such
convictions but allowed a trial judge to admit older convictions if "'the

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 672-73, 631 S.E.2d at 682.

79.

FED. R. EVID. 609.

Id. at 673, 631 S.E.2d at 682.
Ga. H.R. Bill 170, Spec. Sess. (2005).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (Supp. 2007).

80. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84,1(b); FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
81. 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006).
82. Id. at 818-19, 631 S.E.2d at 373.
83. Id. at 819, 631 S.E.2d at 373 (citing United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 275 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
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probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect."'' 4 Given
the likelihood that older convictions have little probative value and the
fact that probative convictions could, in the discretion of the trial court,
still be admitted, the supreme court held that the prohibition of O. C.G.A.
section 24-9-84.1(b) against the use of convictions more than ten years
old did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights."5
The second significant difference between O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1
and prior Georgia law involves the nature of crimes that can be used as
evidence to impeach a witness. Under prior Georgia law, a witness could
be impeached by evidence of a felony conviction or a misdemeanor
conviction involving "moral turpitude." 6 Under the new law, a witness,
other than a criminal defendant, can be impeached with evidence of a
conviction punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or
more-essentially a felony-and with evidence of conviction of any crime,
regardless of the punishment,
if the crime involves "dishonesty or
8
making a false statement."
The court of appeals decision in Adams v. State"s highlights the
difference between a crime of moral turpitude and a crime of dishonesty
or false statement. In Adams the defendant claimed that the trial court
erred when it allowed the prosecution to impeach his credibility with a
misdemeanor conviction for theft by receiving stolen property. Because
the case was tried after the effective date of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1,
the defendant contended that the conviction was not admissible because
it did not involve dishonesty or making a false statement.8 9 The court
acknowledged that under prior Georgia law, crimes such as theft and
shoplifting were considered crimes of moral turpitude and thus such
misdemeanor convictions could be used to impeach a witness. 90
However, the court reasoned, if the Georgia General Assembly had
"intended for the new law to be applied in the same manner as the
existing law, it seems logical that it would have used the same
language." 91 Consequently, the court endeavored to determine exactly
what constituted a crime of dishonesty or false statement under the new
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1.92

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id., 631 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b)).
Id. at 819-20, 631 S.E.2d at 374.
E.g., Mullins v. Thompson, 274 Ga. 366, 366, 533 S.E.2d 154, 155 (2001).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(3).
284 Ga. App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (2007).
Id. at 537, 644 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 539, 644 S.E.2d at 432.
Id.
Id. at 540, 644 S.E.2d at 432.
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Turning to federal case law interpreting Rule 609(a)(2), the court
noted that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals made clear that crimes
such as theft, robbery, or shoplifting were not crimes involving dishonesty or making a false statement within the meaning of Rule 609. 9'
Similarly, looking at the conference committee notes on Rule 609, 9' the
former Fifth Circuit held that crimes of dishonesty and false statement
included "'crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other
offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves
some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the
accused's propensity to testify truthfully."' 95 The court of appeals
concluded that the focus in federal courts was on the witness's propensity for dishonesty while testifying. 96 However, the court acknowledged
that some states that had adopted Rule 609 had not always agreed with
the federal courts' interpretation of what constituted crimes of dishonesty and false statement.97 Again, however, the court reasoned that if
the General Assembly had intended Georgia law to remain unchanged,
it would not have used different language to describe the types of
misdemeanors that could be used to impeach a witness. 9 Indeed, the
court noted, the Georgia Supreme Court in Hinton had turned to federal
law to assist in its interpretation of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1. 99
Accordingly, the court concluded that in Georgia, as in federal courts, a
misdemeanor conviction for theft by receiving stolen property is not a
crime involving dishonesty within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 24-984. 1(a)(3) and that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution
to impeach the defendant with a conviction of that crime.1 °0 Alas,
however, the court concluded that the error was harmless.'01
In Todd v. Byrd,' °2 the court of appeals addressed a factual scenario
that will rarely be encountered, but when it is, the court's decision may
provide clear guidance. In Todd the defendant submitted a deposition
transcript of its employee in support of a motion for summary judgment.

93. Id. at 537, 644 S.E.2d at 430 (citing United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 979
(Former 5th Cir. 1978)).
94. FED. R. EVID. 609 conference committee's note.
95. Adams, 284 Ga. App. at 538, 644 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1597
(1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7103).
96. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 431.
97. Id. at 539, 644 S.E.2d at 431-32.
98. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 432.
99. Id. at 540, 644 S.E.2d at 432.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 541, 644 S.E.2d at 433.
102. 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006).
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In an apparent effort to impeach the deposition testimony of the
employee, the plaintiff tendered evidence of the employee's conviction,
subsequent to her deposition testimony, for obstructing a law enforcement officer. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court
erred when it refused to rule on its motion to strike evidence of the
conviction. 10 3 It is likely that the trial court did not rule on the motion
because it did not see a need to waste judicial resources addressing an
issue of witness credibility in the context of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, given that credibility issues have no bearing on
summary judgment rulings.
Nevertheless, the defendant felt it necessary to raise this issue on
appeal, and perhaps surprisingly, the court of appeals addressed the
issue even though it conceded "that in most instances it would be
impossible practically for a witness to be impeached by a conviction
occurring after the witness testifies."0 4 While the court acknowledged
that in common parlance courts have held that witnesses may be
impeached with "'prior convictions,"' there is no express limitation in
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1 to prior convictions.0 5 Therefore, in the
unlikely event that a witness testifies, and subsequent to his testimony
the witness can be impeached with the
he is convicted of a crime,
06
subsequent conviction.1
Actually, situations in which the court's holding in Todd can be
applied may be more common than the court realized. More and more
frequently, the testimony of witnesses is preserved prior to trial by
videotaped depositions. In such a case, if the witness is convicted of a
felony or a crime involving dishonesty or making a false statement
subsequent to his deposition, then when the deposition is used at trial,
the conviction, pursuant to the court's holding in Todd, can be used to
impeach the witness's videotaped deposition testimony.
B.

PriorStatements By Witnesses

Georgia has two rather unique rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses, rules that implicate both impeachment

103. Id. at 48, 640 S.E.2d at 661-62.
104. Id., 640 S.E.2d at 662. Judge Andrews, in an opinion dissenting from the
majority's ruling on this issue, noted that the issue, involving as it did matters of evidence
at trial, was not a factor in the court's summary judgment ruling and thus should not have
been considered by the court of appeals. Id. at 53, 640 S.E.2d at 665 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. at 48, 640 S.E.2d at 662 (majority opinion).
106. See id.
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and hearsay principles. First, in Gibbons v. State, °7 the supreme
court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible
as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to cross-examination.1 8 Second, pursuant to Cuzzort v. State,'0 9 a prior consistent
statement is admissible as substantive evidence if the witness is present
at trial and is subject to cross-examination." ° However, the supreme
court somewhat weakened the rule. established in Cuzzort when it held
in Woodard v. State"' that prior consistent statements can be admitted only when the veracity of the witness who made the statement has
been placed at issue." 2
The significance of the fact that prior statements can be admitted as
substantive evidence, instead of merely for impeachment purposes, is
illustrated by the court of appeals decision in Meeks v. State."' In
Meeks the defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for assaulting his mother. At trial, the victim
testified that she did not remember her son beating her. The State then
introduced evidence of her prior statement to law enforcement officers,
which confirmed that the defendant had beaten her. The defendant
contended that this "impeachment" evidence could not support the jury's
guilty verdict. 1 14 The court of appeals disagreed, reaffirming wellestablished authority-such as Gibbons-that a prior inconsistent
statement can be used as substantive evidence upon which the jury can
rely in reaching its verdict."'

107. 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
108. Id. at 862, 286 S.E.2d at 721.
109. 254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
110. Id. at 745-46, 334 S.E.2d at 662-63.
111. 269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
112. Id. at 319-20, 496 S.E.2d at 899.
113. 281 Ga. App. 334, 636 S.E.2d 77 (2006).
114. Id. at 335, 636 S.E.2d at 79.
115. Id. at 336-37, 636 S.E.2d at 80; see also Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 632
S.E.2d 152 (2006) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction by the trial
court to the jury that a witness's prior inconsistent statement could be considered only for
purposes of impeachment). In both Meeks and Cummings the appellate courts held that
it is not necessary that the witness actually deny the truth of the prior statement. Meeks,
281 Ga. App. at 336-37, 636 S.E.2d at 80; Cummings, 280 Ga. at 832, 632 S.E.2d at 154.
It is sufficient, as in Meeks, if the witness claims that she does not remember making the
prior statement or, as in Cummings, if the witness disputes the truth of the statement
rather than denying making the statement. Meeks, 281 Ga. App. at 336-37, 636 S.E.2d at
80; Cummings, 280 Ga. at 882, 632 S.E.2d at 154.
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Cross-Examination

Georgia law guarantees litigants the right to a "thorough and sifting
cross-examination."" 6 Of course, the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the
witnesses testifying against him." 7 The court of appeals reinforced
these valuable rights during the survey period in Wright v. State."'
In Wright the defendant contended that he should have been allowed to
cross-examine a prosecutor during a hearing on the defendant's
contention that a second trial on the charges against him was barred by
the doctrine of double jeopardy."9 The defendant's first trial ended in
a mistrial after the prosecutor elicited improper testimony. The prosecution argued that double jeopardy had not attached because the first trial
ended as a result of the defendant's motion for mistrial. 120
The
defendant responded that the prosecutor "deliberately goaded" the
defendant's lawyer into moving for a mistrial by eliciting improper
testimony.' 2 1 At the hearing on the defendant's motion to bar further
prosecution, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to crossexamine the prosecutor. However, the trial court allowed the prosecutor
to explain, by stating in her place, the reasons she asked the question
that led to the improper testimony. Based on this, and taking into
account the prosecutor's experience, the trial court concluded that the
prosecutor's question was not improper and thus the prosecution did not
goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 2 2 The court of appeals
held this to be error. 123 According to the court, "statements in place"
by an attorney constitute evidence.' 24 Clearly, the trial court relied on
the prosecutor's statement to support its decision to deny the defendant's
double jeopardy plea.'25 Consequently, the trial court's refusal to allow
the defendant to cross-examine the prosecutor denied the defendant
the
26
right to confront witnesses offering testimony against him.

116.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (1995).

117.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

118. 284 Ga. App. 169, 643 S.E.2d 538 (2007).
119. Id. at 170, 643 S.E.2d at 539-40; O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(a) (2007).
120. Wright, 284 Ga. App. at 170, 643 S.E.2d at 539-40.
121. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 540.
122. Id. at 171, 643 S.E.2d at 540.
123. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 541.
124. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Ga. Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. Perry, 193 Ga. App. 288, 300,
387 S.E.2d 898, 908 (1989)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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IV OPINION TESTIMONY
As discussed in the previous two articles in Mercer Law Review's
Annual Survey of Georgia Law,127 in 2005 the Georgia General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1128 as part of "tort reform"
legislation, adopting, more or less, the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,129 which in turn has
been codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 702.131 It is common for
Georgia lawyers when referring to new O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 to say
simply Daubert or the Daubert statute. However, it is beginning to
become evident that Georgia courts are not applying Georgia's Daubert
statute in quite the same way that federal courts have interpreted and
applied Daubert.
The first question in Georgia Daubert analysis is whether O.C.G.A.
section 24-9-67.1 applies at all. For reasons likely having more to do
with politics than anything else, and certainly not for any stated reason,
the General Assembly exempted criminal cases from O.C.G.A. section 249-67.1.1'' Then, in its 2006 session, the General Assembly exempted
most condemnation cases from the scope of O.C.G.A. section 24-967.1.132 Thus, for purposes of this Article, criminal and civil cases
involving expert testimony issues must be addressed separately.
Apart from the confusion created by the application of O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67.1 to some types of cases but not to others, the statute is
internally inconsistent in at least one respect. Subsection (a) authorizes
an expert to give an opinion even if the facts and data supporting the
opinion are not admissible, while subsection (b)(1) requires that the
expert's opinion be based on facts that will be admitted into evidence.' 33 Although Georgia's appellate courts have not addressed this
issue, at least one trial court has resolved the conflict by striking the
requirement in O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1(b)(1) that an expert's opinions
34
must be based on facts that will be admitted into evidence.

127. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 58 MERCER L. REV. 151, 165-67 (2006); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 204-05 (2005).
128. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2007).
129. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
130. FED. R. EVID. 702; 2005 Ga. Laws 1, § 7.
131. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(a).
132. O.C.G.A. § 22-1-14(b) (Supp. 2007); 2006 Ga. Laws 39, § 5.
133. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(a)-(b)(1).
134. Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 97-A-5105-1 (St. Ct. of Cobb County Aug.
6, 2006).
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The irony of applying Daubertin civil cases but not in criminal cases
is illustrated by the court of appeals decision in Carlson v. State. 131 In
Carlson the trial court revoked the defendant's probation after a test on
a substance found in the defendant's possession suggested that the
substance was marijuana. On appeal, the defendant contended that the
test results should have been excluded because the person performing
the test was not qualified to testify as an expert under O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67.1. Acknowledging that O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 applies only
to civil cases, the defendant argued that probation cases were civil in
nature and
thus subject to the new statute.'36 The court of appeals
137
disagreed.
The court of appeals acknowledged authority suggesting that probation
cases are "'somewhat ... of a civil nature.""3
The court, however,
was not persuaded by this authority because the court had previously
held in 2004 that the long established Harper v. State"" test for the
140
admissibility of expert testimony applied to probation proceedings.
The court's point is unclear; prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67.1 in 2005, the Harper test governed the admissibility of expert
testimony in all cases-civil and criminal. Thus, in 2004 Harper would
have applied to probation proceedings regardless of whether such
proceedings were considered criminal or civil. Nevertheless, in Carlson
the court held, as a matter of first impression, that Georgia's Daubert
statute does not apply to probation proceedings. 14' Thus, no criminal
defendants, including those in probation proceedings, can enjoy the
"protection" afforded civil litigants by O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1.142
Speaking of the Harper test and of expert testimony in probation
proceedings, in Mann v. State, 143 the court of appeals faced the question of whether the Roche "On Track" drug test had reached a scientific
state of verifiable certainty, making it admissible pursuant to Harper.
In Mann the trial court revoked the defendant's probation based on

135. 280 Ga. App. 595, 634 S.E.2d 410 (2006).
136. Id. at 596, 634 S.E.2d at 412.
137. Id. at 598, 634 S.E.2d at 414.
138. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 413 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518, 130 S.E.2d 790, 791 (1963)).
139. 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
140. Grinstead v. State, 269 Ga. App. 820, 821-22, 605 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2004); see also
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 249, 260 (2003) (explaining the Harper
test).
141. Carlson, 280 Ga. App. at 598, 634 S.E.2d at 414.
142. See id.
143. 285 Ga. App. 39, 645 S.E.2d 573 (2007).
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evidence of a positive On Track test result.1 4 1 Pursuant to the Harper
test, a trial court's determination with regard to whether a test or
principle has reached a scientific state of verifiable certainty can be
based on several things,, including evidence admitted at trial, learned
treatises, or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions. 145 With
regard to recognition by other courts of a test's scientific status, a judge
may judicially notice decisions of other courts on the issue. 146 However, one case is not enough.'47
This issue-the admissibility of On Track results-is one with which
the court of appeals has had some experience in recent years. In
Grinstead v. State,'14 discussed in Mercer Law Review's 2005 Annual
Survey of Georgia Law,'49 the defendant contended that the trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted the positive results of the On
Track test. In Grinsteadthe probation officer who administered the test
admitted on cross-examination that he did not have the expertise to
testify about the accuracy of the test. Applying the Harper test, the trial
court relied on Cheatwood v. State' 50 to conclude that the On Track
test had reached a stage of scientific certainty.'
However, the court
of appeals in Grinstead noted that in Cheatwood the test had been used
to determine the presence of marijuana and cocaine, not morphine and
52
methamphetamine, which were the drugs at issue in Grinstead.'
Accordingly, the court held that there was not sufficient evidence in
Grinstead to establish the scientific reliability of the On Track test.'
In Mann the trial court also relied on Cheatwood to admit the positive
On Track result.'
In Cheatwood there was expert testimony supporting the reliability of the On Track test. 55 Pretermitting the question
of whether Cheatwood, standing alone, could have provided the trial
court in Mann with some support for its decision to admit the test
results, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not properly

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
in Marc
155.

Id. at 39, 645 S.E.2d at 574.
Id. at 41, 645 S.E.2d at 576.
Id.
Id. (citing Grinstead v. State, 269 Ga. App. 820, 605 S.E.2d 417 (2004)).
269 Ga. App. 820, 605 S.E.2d 417 (2004).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 208 (2005).
248 Ga. App. 617, 548 S.E.2d 384 (2001).
Grinstead,269 Ga. App. at 821, 605 S.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 823, 605 S.E.2d at 419-20.
Id., 605 S.E.2d at 420.
285 Ga. App. at 41, 645 S.E.2d at 576. Cheatwood was discussed by the author
T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 208-09 (2005).
248 Ga. App. at 620, 548 S.E.2d at 387.
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take judicial notice of Cheatwood."6 Before a court can take judicial
notice, certain formalities are required, including the requirement that
the court notify the parties of its intention to take judicial notice and
provide them with an opportunity to be heard on the issue. 157 Because
the trial court failed to notify the parties, Cheatwood was not properly
before the court.1" 8 Thus, there was no evidence admissible to establish that the On Track test had reached a scientific state of verifiable
certainty; therefore, the trial court erred when it considered the results
of the test in determining whether the defendant's probation should have
been revoked.159
Perhaps the most significant decision involving O.C.G.A. section 24-967.1 during the survey period was Cotten v. Phillips.16 1 In Cotten the
plaintiff contended that his orthopedic surgeon negligently failed to
recognize a post-surgical vascular problem, and as a result, the plaintiff's
leg was amputated. When the plaintiff filed his lawsuit, he attached an
affidavit, as required by O.C.G.A. section 9_11_9.1,161 of a physician
attesting to at least one act of negligence on the part of the defendant.
However, the physician who gave the affidavit was a vascular surgeon,
not an orthopedic surgeon. The defendant contended that under
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1, a vascular surgeon is not qualified to opine
on whether an orthopedic surgeon has met the standard of care.' 62
Specifically, the defendant relied on the requirement of O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67.1 that "'[i]n the case of a medical malpractice action, [an expert
must have] actual professional knowledge and experience in the area of
practice or specialty in which the opinion is to be given."""' The trial
court concluded that O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 did not impose a strict
specialty requirement for experts but rather recognized the potential
overlap of specialty or practice areas. Thus, even though the defendant
was an orthopedic surgeon, the issue was what should have been done
a vascular surgeon was
in view of the plaintiff's vascular issues, 6and
4
qualified to render opinions on that issue.1
The court of appeals agreed.' 65 Looking at the limited legislative
history available, the court concluded that the trial court's interpretation

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

285 Ga. App. at 41-43, 645 S.E.2d at 576-77.
Id. at 42, 645 S.E.2d at 576.
Id., 645 S.E.2d at 577.
Id. at 42-43, 645 S.E.2d at 577.
280 Ga. App. 280, 633 S.E.2d 655 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2007).
Cotten, 280 Ga. App. at 282, 633 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(c)(2)).
Id. at 283, 633 S.E.2d at 657.
Id., 633 S.E.2d at 657-58.
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of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 was consistent with the General Assembly's
intent.'66
The court noted that the General Assembly rejected a
proposed amendment to the statute that would have imposed a strict
specialty requirement.'6 7 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that
the General Assembly, when it enacted O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1,
specifically instructed Georgia courts to take into account Daubert and
its progeny when interpreting the new statute. 168 In what may have
been a gentle tweak at the General Assembly in response to this
legislative direction to follow Daubert and thus presumably tighten the
rules on expert testimony, the court noted that federal courts applying
Daubert had rejected a strict specialty requirement.169
Therefore,
because the area of practice in issue was vascular, the vascular surgeon
was qualified to render an opinion on whether the orthopedic surgeon
breached the standard of care. 7 '
The court of appeals returned to this issue in MCG Health, Inc. v.
Barton. 7' In MCG Health, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants'
urologists were negligent when they failed to timely treat an injury to
the plaintiffs' son's testicle. The plaintiffs attached to their complaint
an affidavit from an emergency room physician who testified that the
urologists were negligent because they failed to recognize and timely
treat the injury. After discovery, the defendant moved to exclude from
evidence any testimony by the emergency room physician that the
urologists breached the standard of care.'72 The trial court denied the
motion, and the court of appeals granted the defendants' application for
interlocutory review. 7 3
Citing Cotten the court of appeals affirmed.' 7 4 The court noted that the plaintiffs' expert contended that
the urologists were negligent because they failed to appreciate the
emergent nature of the injury.'75 Specifically, the expert testified that
salvaging the testicle required expedited treatment and that a patient
presenting to an emergency room with acute scrotal pain must receive
diagnostic treatment as soon as possible to rule out the possibility of

166. Id. at 283-84, 633 S.E.2d at 658.
167. Id. at 284-85, 633 S.E.2d at 658.
168. Id. at 286, 633 S.E.2d at 659 (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f)).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Abramson v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 617, 619, 636 S.E.2d 765, 767
(2006) (holding that an orthopedist was qualified to give expert testimony in support of a
medical malpractice action against a neurologist).
171. 285 Ga. App. 577, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007).
172. Id. at 580, 647 S.E.2d at 84.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 582, 647 S.E.2d at 86.
175. Id. at 584, 647 S.E.2d at 87.
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testicular torsion. Although the defendants were urologists, the issue
was not one of urological surgery, but rather whether the urologist 17acted
6
timely when the plaintiffs' son presented to the emergency room.
In MCG Health, the defendants, in addition to attacking the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' standard of care expert testimony, also challenged
the plaintiffs' expert testimony on causation under O.C.G.A. section 24-967.1.17 Some would argue that the brunt of Daubert has been most
strongly felt on causation issues, a point that can be illustrated by the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in McDowell v. Brown. 7 s In McDowell the
plaintiff claimed that he had been permanently injured by the defen179
dants' failure to timely refer him for treatment of a spinal abscess.
Although the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's experts were
qualified to testify on the issue of causation, the court decided that the
experts' specific testimony that the plaintiff was injured as a result of
the delay in treatment was not sufficiently reliable to satisfy Daubert
because the experts could not cite specific studies supporting their
causation opinions.' 0
For example, one expert relied on a study
addressing forty-eight hour delays in treatment.' 8' Because the delay
in the plaintiff's treatment was twenty-four hours and not forty-eight,
the court held that the forty-eight hour delay studies could not be used
to support the expert's testimony about the consequences of a twentyfour hour delay in treatment.'8 2 Moreover, the plaintiff's experts had
not tested their
theories or determined any error rates associated with
8 3
their theories.
In short, the Eleventh Circuit mechanically applied the standard
Daubert analysis, requiring methodologies supported by peer reviewed
studies and proven error rates.8 4 The Eleventh Circuit did not
address how the plaintiff could have obtained scientific studies
demonstrating that a twenty-four hour delay in the treatment of a spinal
cord abscess could cause injury, and it is doubtful that there are studies
to cover every conceivable aspect of medicine. It would seem, rather,
that perhaps based on studies addressing similar but not identical

176. See id., 647 S.E.2d at 88.
177. Id. at 583, 647 S.E.2d at 87.
178. 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). For a more detailed discussion of Brown, see Marc
T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 206-07 (2005); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1273, 1283-84 (2004).
179. 392 F.3d at 1285.
180. Id. at 1301-02.
181. Id. at 1299.
182. Id. at 1300.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 1298-1300.
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situations, physicians with appropriate experience can reliably opine
that the failure to timely treat a condition will likely result in injury or
additional injury. In the Eleventh Circuit, it appears they cannot." 5
In MCG Health, the defendant raised an argument similar to that
raised by the defendant in McDowell.' The plaintiffs' expert testified
that if testicular torsion is not treated within twelve hours from the time
the patient first begins experiencing symptoms, "the chances of salvaging
the testicle become more remote."" 7 The defendant contended that
because its urologists did not examine the plaintiffs' child until nearly
eleven hours after his injury, the plaintiffs' expert testimony did not
sufficiently establish that if treatment had been commenced at an earlier
point, the testicle could have been saved.' 8 The court of appeals
noted, however, that there was evidence from the defendant's own chief
of urology that there is a fifty percent chance of salvaging some
testicular function up to twelve hours after the injury.8 9 Similarly,
the defendants argued that because the plaintiffs' expert could not
testify about what exact point the testicle became unsalvageable, the
testimony that earlier treatment likely would have salvaged some
testicular function was too speculative; the court of appeals rejected that
argument as well. 9 '
Had the Georgia Court of Appeals analyzed these issues as the
Eleventh Circuit did in McDowell, the court likely would have questioned whether there were peer reviewed studies and methodologies with
acceptable error rates establishing that treatment at one point rather
than treatment at another point more likely than not would have
changed the outcome. The Georgia Court of Appeals, however, chose a
more traditional analysis, at least more traditional in Georgia law.' 9'
Given that the expert testimony was in dispute, the court concluded that
the defendant's arguments about the sufficiency of that expert testimony
"'are better made to a jury, not to an appellate court considering a
summary judgment order."" 9 2 With regard to the argument that the
plaintiffs' expert's inability to place the exact point at which the testicle

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
S.E.2d

See id.
MCG Health, 285 Ga. App. at 580, 647 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 582, 647 S.E.2d at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583, 647 S.E.2d at 87.
See generally id. at 582-84, 647 S.E.2d at 86-88.
Id. at 583, 647 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting Wasdin v. Mager, 274 Ga. App. 885, 889, 619
384, 387 (2005)).
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was beyond salvage, the court simply held that this did not render the
193
expert's testimony mere speculation.
That is not say, however, that Georgia's appellate courts will not
carefully scrutinize expert testimony as required by O.C.G.A. section 24-

9-67.1.

In Smith v. Liberty Chrysler-Plymouth Dodge, Inc.,"

the

plaintiff sought to recover for injuries he suffered in an automobile
accident. The plaintiff claimed that the accident was caused by a defect
in his vehicle, specifically, a loose tie rod that caused him to lose control
of the vehicle. To support his claim, the plaintiff relied on two experts.
The first expert was the plaintiff's son-in-law who had some training as
an accident reconstructionist. The second expert was an experienced,
although not certified, mechanic who had no training in accident
reconstruction. The defendants moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff's experts' testimony was insufficient to establish
that any defect in the car caused the plaintiff's injuries. The trial court
granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.'9 5 The court first
determined that the "relevant area of expertise in this case includes not
only accident reconstruction, but also knowledge of a vehicle's mechanics
1 96
and the role of a mechanical failure in the cause of an accident."
The court determined that neither of the plaintiff's experts were
qualified to render an opinion in this area.'97 Although the plaintiff's
son-in-law had experience with some aspects of accident reconstruction,
he did not have sufficient knowledge or experience to determine whether
a mechanical failure in a vehicle could cause a driver to lose control. 9 '
Although the second expert was an experienced mechanic, he had no
experience in accident reconstruction or analyzing and determining the
consequences of a mechanical failure. 9
Because neither expert was
qualified to testify that a loose tie rod could have caused the plaintiff to
lose control of the vehicle, the trial court did not err when it granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.2 00
Georgia law has long held that expert opinion is not admissible when
the issue is one that the jury can understand by themselves. This
principle was tested during the survey period in Hadden v. ARE
Properties, LLC.2 ° ' In Hadden the widow of a hunter who had been

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 583-84, 647 S.E.2d at 87.
285 Ga. App. 606, 647 S.E.2d 315 (2007).
Id. at 606-07, 647 S.E.2d at 316-17.
Id. at 608, 647 S.E.2d at 318.
Id. at 609, 647 S.E.2d at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id., 647 S.E.2d at 319.
280 Ga. App. 314, 633 S.E.2d 667 (2006).
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accidentally shot sought to recover damages from the hunting club where
the shooting occurred. In support of her claim, the widow offered the
affidavit testimony of an expert on the standard of care required of
hunters and hunting club owners and operators. The trial court
apparently did not rely on the affidavit, instead ruling that the decedent
was a mere licensee and that the undisputed evidence failed to establish
a breach of any duty owed to a licensee. °2 Exercising de novo review,
the court of appeals concluded that the affidavit was inadmissible.2 3
The court held that the standard of care of hunters and hunting clubs
was not a matter beyond the ken of jurors and that expert testimony
would be unnecessary to assist jurors in their determination of the
issues."' In short, the court determined that jurors were competent
to decide whether hunters and hunting clubs exercised ordinary
5
care.

20

Judge Barnes, however, was uncomfortable with the majority's
consideration of the affidavit, which she found unnecessary." 6 She
agreed that the decedent was a licensee and that the case could be
decided on that issue alone. 20 7 Noting that the two cases cited by the
majority in support of its holding that the affidavit was inadmissible
were physical precedent only, she pointedly noted that her special
concurrence made Hadden a mere physical2 precedent
as well, a case that
8
could "not be cited as binding precedent."
Finally, several decisions addressing opinion testimony merit brief
note. In Nelson v. State, °9 the court of appeals held that a psychologist could testify even though she was unlicensed.210 The court held
that Georgia courts have long recognized that the question is whether
a proposed expert has sufficient learning and experience, and merely
being licensed-or not licensed-is not necessarily determinative of
whether a witness has that learning and experience.211 In Rodriguez
v. State,1 2 the court of appeals held that a licensed registered nurse
was sufficiently qualified to testify that an alleged molestation victim's

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 315, 633 S.E.2d at 669.
Id. at 316, 633 S.E.2d at 669.
Id. at 316-17, 633 S.E.2d at 670.
Id.
Id. at 318, 633 S.E.2d at 670-71 (Barnes, J., concurring).
Id. at 317-18, 633 S.E.2d at 671.
Id. at 318, 633 S.E.2d at 671 (citing GA. CT. APP. R. 33(a)).
279 Ga. App. 859, 632 S.E.2d 749 (2006).
Id. at 866, 632 S.E.2d at 756.
Id.
281 Ga. App. 129, 635 S.E.2d 402 (2006).

2007]

EVIDENCE

181

vaginal injuries were consistent with penetration by a finger.213 The
nurse in question had considerable experience and training with regard
to the examination of victims of sexual assault.2 14 In Mitchell v.
State,2 15 the court of appeals reaffirmed that a jury does not need
expert testimony to determine whether or not a picture depicts a
defendant.216 Jurors are fully capable of looking at the picture and at
the defendant and making that determination for themselves.21 7
V.

A.

HEARSAY

Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation

It has been almost four years since the United States Supreme Court
in Crawford v. Washington21" altered the playing field with regard to
the use of hearsay in criminal cases. In Crawford the defendant
contended that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear his
wife's tape recorded statement to police officers. The prosecution
tendered this evidence after the defendant's wife invoked her spousal
privilege, and thus was unavailable to testify. The trial court and the
Washington Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the statement
were sufficiently reliable to overcome the defendant's argument that the
admission of the out-of-court statement violated his Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation.219 Prosecutors argued that since the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,220 courts have
allowed the admission of hearsay statements if the statements fell
within a "'firmly rooted hearsay exception"' or if they bore "'particularIt was the latter lanized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" 221
guage-particularized guarantees of trustworthiness-that courts across
the country interpreted as a green light to admit hearsay testimony. In
Georgia, this bypass around the Sixth Amendment came to be known as
the necessity exception to the hearsay rule.222 As discussed in many
prior surveys, the rapid expansion of the necessity exception (to

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 131-32, 635 S.E.2d at 405.
Id.
283 Ga. App. 456, 641 S.E.2d 674 (2007).
Id. at 458-59, 641 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. at 459, 641 S.E.2d at 677.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 40-41.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 351-54 (1996).
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exaggerate only a bit) seemed on the verge of supplanting live testimony
entirely.223

In Crawford, however, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and concluded that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation was not only limited to in court testimony, but also applied to outof-court "testimonial" statements. 2 4 Testimonial statements include
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony, and "'similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially."'22 5 Thus, a testimonial out-of-court statement is no
longer admissible if the defendant has not had an opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.2 26 Cases applying Crawford have primarily
focused on whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial, which
continued to be the case during this survey period.
The issue of whether 911 telephone calls are testimonial in nature has
been a recurrent issue since Crawford. As discussed in last year's
survey, 227 the Georgia Supreme Court held in Pitts v. State228 that
911 calls may or may not be testimonial in nature.22 9 If the primary
purpose of the telephone call is to establish evidentiary facts that an
objective person would recognize could be used in a future prosecution,
then the call is testimonial.23 ° However, if the call is made to report
a crime in progress or to seek assistance because of imminent danger,
then the caller's statements are not testimonial. 231 The court of
appeals revisited this issue during the current survey period.
In Kimbrell v. State,12 the defendant contended that the trial court
should have excluded the substance of a telephone call to 911 by a
"concerned citizen" reporting "a white male driving a red HarleyDavidson motorcycle wearing only a pair of black boxer shorts."233
Citing the court of appeals decision in Pitts v.State23 (the supreme
court opinion in Pitts is not mentioned), the court of appeals in Kimbrell
simply held that 911 calls are not testimonial because they are neither
made for the purpose of proving a past event nor premeditated, but

223.
224.
225.
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228.
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230.
231.
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See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 235, 247-48 (2004).
541 U.S. at 50-51, 68.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 59.
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 58 MERCER L. REV. 151, 173-74 (2006).
280 Ga. 288, 627 S.E.2d 17 (2006).
Id. at 289, 627 S.E.2d at 19-20.
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 19.
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 19-20.
280 Ga. App. 867, 635 S.E.2d 237 (2006).
Id. at 867, 635 S.E.2d at 238.
272 Ga. App. 182, 612 S.E.2d 1 (2005).
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rather they are made to prevent or stop an ongoing crime.235 In fact,
they are admissible as part of the res gestae.236 Accordingly, the court
of appeals rejected the defendant's contention that Crawford barred the
admission of the 911 caller's statement.3 7
As broad as the res gestae doctrine is,238 it does have its limits, even
in the context of 911 calls. In Orr v. State,3 9 the defendant contended
that the trial court improperly admitted a 911 recording in which an
unknown party, who was not even the caller but who could be heard in
the background, stated the defendant's name.
The prosecution
contended that the recording, including the statement of the unknown
person stating the defendant's name, was admissible as part of the res
gestae.240 The supreme court acknowledged that statements made at
the scene of an incident can be admissible as part of the res gestae when
the statements are "'free from all suspicion of device or afterthought and
are not merely the expression of opinions or conclusions. ' ' 241' However,
there was no evidence that the declarant had personal knowledge that
the defendant was at the scene.242 While the res gestae exception
"'dispenses with the presence of the declarant in court and with the
administering of an oath,"' there still must be some evidence that the
declarant was truly a witness, or in other words, that he or she had
personal knowledge. 243 Because the State failed to show that the
unknown declarant had personal knowledge, the admission of the 911
tape was error, and because of the prosecution's otherwise relatively
weak case, the court concluded that this error was harmful. 2 "
Although Crawford left many unanswered questions with regard to
what types of statements are considered testimonial, the United States
Supreme Court was clear that statements to police officers are invariably
testimonial in nature. 24' Almost without a doubt, the Supreme Court
was thinking about statements made to police officers in their official

235. Kimbrell, 280 Ga. App. at 868, 635 S.E.2d at 239 (citing Pitts, 272 Ga. App. at 186,
612 S.E.2d at 4-5).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 215 (2005); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 235, 250 (2004).
239. 281 Ga. 112, 636 S.E.2d 505 (2006).
240. Id. at 112, 636 S.E.2d at 507.
241. Id. at 113, 636 S.E.2d at 507 (quoting Dolensek v. State, 274 Ga. 678, 679, 558
S.E.2d 713, 715 (2002)).
242. Id.
243. Id. (quoting Dolensek, 274 Ga. at 679, 558 S.E.2d at 715-16).
244. Id.
245. 541 U.S. at 53.
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capacity, and that was the conclusion reached by the Georgia Supreme
Court in Turner v. State,246 a high profile case involving the poisoning
death of the defendant's husband. During the defendant's trial, the trial
court admitted into evidence statements made by the defendant's
husband, who was a police officer, to fellow officers.2 47 Apparently, the
defendant's husband had reason to believe that his wife wished him
harm, and he told his fellow officers that if he "ended up dead," then his
wife would probably be his murderer.2 4' The trial court admitted
evidence of the husband's statements pursuant to the necessity
exception.249
On appeal, the defendant contended that because the statements were
made to police officers, they were testimonial in nature under Crawford. 5 ° The supreme court disagreed.25' Although the statements
were made to police officers, they were made in the context of one
coworker speaking to another as a close friend. The husband was not
being interrogated and there was no reasonable expectation that the
statements would be used at trial.252 This latter point can be debated.
It would seem that the husband was letting his fellow police officers
know that if anything happened to him, they should suspect that his
wife murdered him. In any event, it is clear that the statements were
not made as part of a police interrogation. In short, the mere fact that
statements were made to a police officer does not make them testimonial; the relevant inquiry is whether the statements were made as part of
a police interrogation.2 53
The court of appeals decision in Little v. State54 seems to test the
limits of Crawford'sprohibition against the use of out-of-court testimonial statements. In Little the trial court permitted a police officer to, in
effect, testify about statements made by a confidential informant who
did not testify at trial. Based upon information provided by the
confidential informant, a narcotics officer arranged a drug buy with the
defendant in a Wal-Mart parking lot. The officer testified that he knew
what type of vehicle the defendant would be driving, that the defendant's
vehicle matched the description he had been given, and that the officer

246. 281 Ga. 647, 641 S.E.2d 527 (2007).
247. Id. at 647, 641 S.E.2d at 529.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 649-50, 641 S.E.2d at 531.
250. Id. at 649, 641 S.E.2d at 530-31.
251. Id. at 651, 641 S.E.2d at 531-32.
252. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 531.
253. Id.; see also Gresham v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881, 883, 644 S.E.2d 122, 124 (2007)
(holding that Crawford did not apply to evidence offered at a preliminary hearing).
254. 280 Ga. App. 60, 633 S.E.2d 403 (2006).
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had told the informant what drugs he wanted the defendant to bring to
the Wal-Mart. 251 While the testimony did not actually repeat statements made by the informant, the court of appeals acknowledged that
the "jury could infer from the exchanges that the officer was guided to
[the defendant] by the informant's descriptions of the seller and her
car."256 However, the court dodged the question of whether this
testimony constituted the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements by holding that the informant's statements were not offered to
prove the truth of those statements but rather to explain the officer's
conduct." 7 Because Crawford "'does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted,"' the admission of the informant's statement to explain the
officer's conduct was not error.258 It is interesting that the court of
appeals relied upon the "explain conduct" exception to the hearsay rule
to uphold the defendant's conviction because in Teague v. State,259 the
Georgia Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that prosecutors could not
use the explain conduct exception to the hearsay rule to admit hearsay
evidence.2"'
At heart, a criminal prosecution is designed to find the truth of what
a defendant did, and, on occasion, of why he did it. It is most unusual
that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why an investigating officer did something.
If the hearsay rule is to remain a part of our law, then O.C.G.A.
[section] 24-3-2 . . . must be contained within its proper limit. Otherwise, the repetition of the rote words "to explain conduct" can become
imprimatur for the admission of rumor, gossip, and speculation.26'
B.

The Necessity Exception

Although Crawford dramatically limited the scope of Georgia's
necessity exception (no longer are law enforcement officers routinely
allowed to testify with regard to what unavailable witnesses told them),
the necessity exception can still be applied in situations where Crawford,

255. Id. at 63, 633 S.E.2d at 405.
256. Id.

257. Id.
258. Id. at 64, 633 S.E.2d at 406 (quoting Crawford, 549 U.S. at 59 n.9).
259. 252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
260. Id. at 536, 314 S.E.2d at 912.
261. Id.; see also Britton v. State, 257 Ga. App. 441, 442, 571 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2002)
(reversing the defendant's conviction because the trial court, on the basis of explaining
conduct, erroneously admitted testimony that an anonymous informant told a detective the
defendant would be driving a particular vehicle and would have concealed money and
drugs under a false bottom in the vehicle's console).
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for whatever reason, is not applicable.2 62 Georgia's necessity exception
requires the presence of three elements: "[1] the declarant must be
unavailable to testify; [2] there must be particularized guarantees of the
statement's trustworthiness; and [3] the statement must be both
relevant to a material fact and more probative regarding that fact than
any other evidence."263
In Holton v. State,2 the defendant contended that the trial court
improperly relied on the necessity exception to admit a statement made
by an unavailable witness. In Holton the defendant admitted that she
shot her husband's former wife in 1983, but she claimed the shooting
was accidental.2 65 At the time of the shooting, the defendant's brother,
a former Army medic, was in the house. Shortly after the shooting, the
defendant's husband asked the brother why he did not render assistance
to the victim given his medical training.266 The brother responded,
"'[Wiell [the defendant] slammed the door and said, "leave the bitch
lay."' 2 67 It was this statement, recounted by the husband, that the
trial court admitted pursuant to the necessity exception. The brother
died long before the trial and was thus unavailable to testify. But the
necessity exception also requires that the statement bear particular
guarantees of trustworthiness.26 s The trial court found this guarantee
of trustworthiness by virtue of the fact that the declarant and the
husband were in-laws.2 69 The supreme court was troubled by this
conclusion, noting that the mere fact of familial relationship is not
sufficient by itself to establish trustworthiness.2 7 ° On the contrary, the
declarant and the defendant's husband had only known each other for
a short period of time, and there was no evidence that they were
confidants.27 1 Accordingly, the supreme court determined that there
were not sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to render the
declarant's statements admissible pursuant to the necessity excep-

262. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 249, 265 (2003).
263. Id.
264. 280 Ga. 843, 632 S.E.2d 90 (2006).
265. Id. at 844, 632 S.E.2d at 92. Although the defendant was arrested shortly after
the shooting, a grand jury refused to indict her. The case was reopened nearly twenty
years later at the instigation of the victim's family. Id. at 844-45, 632 S.E.2d at 93.
266. Id. at 846, 632 S.E.2d at 94.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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The error in admitting the statement, however, was harm-

Medical Narratives

In 1997 the Georgia General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. section 24-318,274 which provides that in personal injury cases, a "medical report
in narrative form which has been signed and dated" by a healthcare
professional is admissible to prove diagnoses, prognoses, and interpretations of tests and examinations. 5 In the years since, there have been
few decisions providing guidance on exactly what is meant by the term
"medical narrative." Does the statute require a narrative specifically
prepared for use as evidence, or can an office note or a radiology report
constitute a medical narrative? In Lott v. Ridley,276 the court of
appeals provided some definitive answers to these questions.
In Lott the trial court admitted reports from two physicians tendered
by the plaintiff pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18. One report
appeared to be a narrative prepared by the physician, or perhaps the
plaintiff's attorney for the physician, specifically for use at trial. The
physician addressed the plaintiff's injuries, his diagnosis, the treatment
he provided the plaintiff, and his prognosis in narrative form. Although
the physician used medical terminology, he apparently explained the
meaning of the medical terms in lay terms. The report from the second
physician was not a narrative at all but rather a copy of the physician's
office notes. The notes contained many undefined medical terms and
unexplained test results. 7
After a verdict for the plaintiff, the court of appeals held that the
narrative report from the first physician was clearly admissible. 27
The second report, however, did not satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A.
section 24-3-18.279 According to the court, the "bare recitation of the
doctor's unedited records clearly is not a medical narrative ... [because
it] 'does not set forth the relevant information in prose language that is
more readily understandable to laymen.'" 28 0 The plaintiff made no
effort, the court concluded, to present the doctor's records to the jury in
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274.
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280.

Id.
Id. at 847, 632 S.E.2d at 94.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-18 (Supp. 2007).
Id.
285 Ga. App. 513, 647 S.E.2d 292 (2007).
Id. at 514, 647 S.E.2d at 294.
Id.
Id. at 515, 647 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. (quoting Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844, 847, 607 S.E.2d 552, 574 (2005)).
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a format that would make them readily understandable.28 1 Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the second
doctor's office notes.282
It would seem the lesson from Lott is that unless office notes are
narratives using terminology understandable to lay persons, a standard
that physician office notes rarely meet, lawyers seeking the admission
of medical information pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18 should
prepare for the doctor to sign a narrative that contains only information
relevant to the medical conditions at issue and that
explains the
28 3
information in a way that is understandable to a jury.
D.

Child Hearsay

Georgia's child hearsay statute permits a witness to testify about
statements made by a child describing sexual conduct or abuse.2 84 For
the child's statement to be admissible, the child must be "available to
testify," and "the court [must find] that the circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability."2 5 Over the years,
Georgia's appellate courts have struggled to define at what point an
understandably reluctant child victim is unavailable to testify and thus
not subject to cross-examination. For example, in In re B. W.,286 which
was discussed in a previous survey,287 a juvenile court judge refused
to allow the cross-examination of a child even though the child's
statements had previously been admitted pursuant to the child hearsay
statute. On appeal, even the prosecution was forced to agree that the
child's unavailability for cross-examination rendered her out-of-court
statements inadmissible and of no probative value.288 Similarly, in
Hines v. State,289 the court of appeals held that a child was unavailable
for cross-examination when the child would not take the stand and the
trial court excused the child without him ever being sworn and examined
as a witness.29 °

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Also during the survey period, the court held that medical narratives, admissible
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18, are not limited to use at trial, but can also be used
in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment. Dalton v. City of
Marietta, 280 Ga. App. 202, 204, 633 S.E.2d 552, 554 (2006).
284. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
285. Id.
286. 268 Ga. App. 862, 602 S.E.2d 869 (2004).
287. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 218 (2005).
288. In re B.W., 268 Ga. App. at 862, 602 S.E.2d at 870.
289. 248 Ga. App. 752, 548 S.E.2d 642 (2001).
290. Id. at 754, 548 S.E.2d at 644.

2007]

EVIDENCE

189

During the current survey period, the court of appeals dealt with a
similar, but slightly different, scenario. In In re S.S.,291 through the
testimony of a victim's mother, sister, and an investigating officer, the
juvenile court admitted evidence of statements made by the child about
acts of molestation committed by the defendant. The defendant then
sought to cross-examine the victim. Because the matter was pending in
juvenile court, there was no jury, and the juvenile court judge, presumably to avoid unnecessary trauma to the child, suggested that the
examination take place in chambers.292 Although the proceedings in
chambers were not transcribed, the judge later announced that "it was
not in the best interest of the child to be questioned, 'given the fact that
we can't get any information out of the young lady."'293 The defendant
then moved to dismiss the delinquency petition on the grounds that no
evidence of molestation was admissible because the child was unavailable for cross-examination.29 4 The juvenile court judge denied the
motion, finding that the child was in fact available, although "'as far
as-as whether or not she's going to give us any information, it appears
that ... she's not going to talk to us."'295
After the juvenile court adjudicated the defendant delinquent, the
defendant appealed and, relying on Hines, contended that the child was
not available as required by the child hearsay statute. 296 However, the
court of appeals distinguished Hines, holding that it is only necessary
that the child be available for cross-examination. 297 Even if the child
is uncommunicative or unresponsive, a defendant still has had an
opportunity to confront the child, and that is sufficient to satisfy the
availability requirement of the child hearsay statute. The point is that
the fact-finder, in this case the juvenile court judge, had an opportunity
to observe the child, including the child's refusal to testify, and thus
could assess the child's credibility. 298 Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the defendant's delinquency adjudication.2 99
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281 Ga. App. 781, 637 S.E.2d 151 (2006).
Id. at 782, 637 S.E.2d at 152.
Id., 637 S.E.2d at 153.
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Statements by Co-Conspirators

According to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-5,300 a statement by one coconspirator during the pendency of the conspiracy is admissible against
his co-conspirators." °' If the co-conspirator's statements are otherwise
admissible, the trial court, before admitting the statements, must
evaluate the reliability of the statements using four indicia of reliability:
(1) the absence of an express assertion about a past fact; (2) the
declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and roles of the
participants in the crime and cross-examination of the declarant would
not have shown that the declarant was unlikely to know whether the
defendant was involved in the crime; (3) the possibility that the
declarant's statement was founded on faulty recollection was remote;
and (4) the circumstances under which the declarant gave the
statement suggest that the declarant did not misrepresent the
defendant's involvement in the crime.0 2
In Smith v. State, °3 the defendant argued that an alleged coconspirator's statement was inadmissible because it constituted an
express assertion about past facts. 30 4 Acknowledging this to be the
case, the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the defendant's
conviction, reasoning that the statement was sufficiently reliable when
measured against the other three indicia of reliability.3 5 Thus, the
mere fact that a co-conspirator's statement constitutes
an assertion
3 6
about a past fact does not preclude its admissibility.
While it is necessary that the statements by a co-conspirator be made
during the pendency of the conspiracy, it is now well established that
statements made to conceal the fact that there has been a criminal
conspiracy are still considered to have been made during the conspiracy.307 However, it is sometimes difficult to tell when the concealment
phase has ended, as illustrated by the supreme court's decision in Brooks
v. State. °8 In Brooks the defendants, who had been charged with

300. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (1995).
301. Id.
302. Copeland v. State, 266 Ga. 664, 665, 469 S.E.2d 672, 674-75 (1996) (citing Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970)).
303. 253 Ga. App. 131, 558 S.E.2d 455 (2001).
304. Id. at 134, 558 S.E.2d at 459.
305. Id.
306. See id.; see also Ottis v. State, 269 Ga. 151, 496 S.E.2d 264 (1998), discussed in
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 50 MERCER L. REV. 229, 255-56 (1998).
307. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 249, 273 (2003).
308. 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (2006).
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murder, contended that the trial court erroneously admitted statements
made by their alleged co-conspirators while those co-conspirators were
in jail. The opinion does not say whether the co-conspirators were in jail
for the offense that was the object of the conspiracy. Certainly, however,
while in jail, those conspirators were not actively participating in the
conspiracy. Accordingly, the defendants argued that the co-conspirators'
jailhouse statements were made after the conspiracy ended, and because
the co-conspirators were talking about their participation in the alleged
conspiracy, they clearly were not in a concealment phase of the
conspiracy." 9 The court of appeals disagreed.310 Just because the coconspirators were talking to third parties did not necessarily mean they
were not still trying to conceal the fact of the conspiracy. 1 Nor does
the concealment phase of the conspiracy end simply because one or more
conspirators is jailed.312 The significant fact was that the co-conspirators were "still hiding their identities from the police, and [their
statements] were thus made during the concealment phase of the
conspiracy."313
Next, the defendants argued that even if the statements met the
criteria of Georgia's co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule,
admitting the statements would violate their confrontation clause rights
because the statements did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability,
primarily because the jailhouse statements, like the statements on issue
in Smith, were assertions of past facts." 4 The supreme court acknowledged that this one criterion did not support the reliability of the
statements, but consideration of the remaining criteria of reliability
provided sufficient evidence to uphold the admission of the statements." 5 The co-conspirators were speaking of matters within their
personal knowledge, and their statements were consistent with each
other and with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Most importantly, the co-conspirators implicated themselves 3in
their statements, a
16
factor that weighed heavily in favor of reliability.

309. Id. at 16, 635 S.E.2d at 727.
310. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 728.
311. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 727-28.
312. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 728.
313. Id. at 17, 635 S.E.2d at 728.
314. Id. at 16, 635 S.E.2d at 727.
315. Id. at 17, 635 S.E.2d at 728.
316. Id. at 18, 635 S.E.2d at 728-29. The defendants also argued that the admission
of co-conspirator statements was improper pursuant to Crawford, but the supreme court
easily dismissed that contention because their statements were not testimonial in nature.
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AUTHENTICATION

As the court of appeals put it during the survey period, electronic
evidence, such as emails and text messages, presents "unique opportunities for fabrication." 317 However, as the court of appeals also made
clear, electronic evidence is still subject to the same standards of
authentication that apply to other evidence.318
In Simon v. State,"9 the defendant contended that the trial court
erroneously admitted email correspondence allegedly between the
defendant and his minor victim. The evidence consisted of printouts of
various email messages. However, only one of the emails contained the
defendant's email address. According to detectives, the defendant
admitted that he had exchanged emails with the victim.3 20 The victim
herself testified that the printout was an "accurate representation" of her
email correspondence with the defendant.321 Looking at the totality of
the evidence tending to authenticate the printout, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted the evidence. 22
In Hammontree v. State,32 3 even less authenticating evidence was
sufficient to warrant the admission of electronic evidence. In Hammontree, during the defendant's trial for child molestation, the trial court
admitted a transcript of an instant message conversation between the
defendant and his victim.324 Such electronic evidence, the court of
appeals ruled, can be authenticated in the same way that a videotape is
authenticated.325 In the case of a videotape, it can be authenticated
by the person who prepared the videotape or by a person who witnessed
the events portrayed in the videotape and is able to testify that the
videotape accurately portrays what the witness saw.32 6 At the defendant's trial, the victim testified that she was a participant in the
exchange of instant messages, and she confirmed that the transcript
accurately reflected the messages exchanged. She further testified that
the transcript was printed from her computer in her presence. However,

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Simon v. State, 279 Ga. App. 844, 847, 632 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2006).
Id.
279 Ga. App. 844, 632 S.E.2d 723 (2006).
Id. at 847, 632 S.E.2d at 726-27.
Id., 632 S.E.2d at 726.
Id. at 848, 632 S.E.2d at 727.
283 Ga. App. 736, 642 S.E.2d 412 (2007).
Id. at 739, 642 S.E.2d at 415.
Id.
Id. (citing Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 697, 617 S.E.2d 262, 265-66 (2005)).
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the instant messages were not sent from the defendant's account, but
rather they were sent from an account maintained by his son. However,
the son testified that he did not send the messages, and the messages
contained information that provided some indication that they were
written by the defendant.327 Under these circumstances, the court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
printout of the instant messages.3 28

327.
328.

Id.
Id. at 740, 642 S.E.2d at 415.

